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Abstract
This paper presents a new approach to analysing and understanding civil emer-
gency planning based on the notion of responsibility modelling combined with
HAZOPS-style analysis of information requirements. Our goal is to represent com-
plex contingency plans so that they can be more readily understood, so that in-
consistencies can be highlighted and vulnerabilities discovered. In this paper, we
outline the framework for contingency planning in the UK and introduce the notion
of responsibility models as a means of representing the key features of contingency
plans. Using a case study of a flooding emergency, we illustrate our approach to re-
sponsibility modelling and suggest how it adds value to current textual contingency
plans.
Key words: contingency planning, responsibility modelling, socio-technical
systems
1 Introduction
The management of large scale civil emergencies is a complex activity. There
are a diverse range of possible emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks
and serious accidents, environmental emergencies, such as flooding, and the
outbreak of animal and human diseases. Responding to these emergencies
involves many different organisations, including the emergency services (fire,
police, ambulance), local authorities, environmental agencies and charities.
Civil emergency (or contingency) planning is concerned with drawing up plans
to cope with these scenarios. The process is one of several aspects of the
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Fig. 1. Some issues to be considered during the response to a flooding event. The
sketch was by an Emergency Planning Officer, during early discussions of this work.
broader activity of crisis management within organisations [30]. As well as
the task of dealing with immediate problems, planners must take into account
issues such as the displacement of people, dealing with the media and man-
aging and maintaining the emergency team over a prolonged period. Figure
1 is a sketch of some of the issues that an emergency planner discussed with
us when explaining the response to a flooding event, a particular concern in
the United Kingdom, due to a series of unexpectedly severe weather events
[12,25].
From a single organisational perspective, the purpose of planning is to pro-
vide guidance on the procedures, resources and training that are likely to
be required for a particular emergency. Inter-organisational contingency plans
are used by individual agencies to understand both the responsibilities they
hold and the responsibilities that others can be expected to discharge. Effec-
tive communications and information exchange between organisations is essen-
tial for the effective management of emergencies. Thus, contingency planning
should consider inter-organisational information and communication require-
ments.
The inherently unpredictable nature of emergencies is such that it is inappro-
priate to express contingency plans in terms of detailed processes and actions
[26,30]. Rather, these plans set out what is expected in particular situations,
the agencies that will be involved and the assumptions that are made. These
assumptions generally include what is expected of different agencies who coop-
erate to manage the emergency. Often, plans are written in terms of assumed
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responsibilities. For example, they may set out that it is the responsibility of
a meteorological agency to provide information concerning rainfall; that an
environment agency is responsible for using the information to predict poten-
tial flooding patterns; that the police are responsible for evacuating residents
from an area in danger; and that the provision of shelter for evacuees is the
responsibility of a local authority.
The contingency plans we have reviewed are predominantly textual documents
with informal diagrams and tables. As with all complex documents, there is
scope for error, omission, ambiguity and misunderstanding. Smith has also
noted that contingency plans often contain assumptions which are later ex-
posed as invalid during an exercise or actual crisis [29]. These problems are
sometimes concealed by the free text nature of documents and, as is always
the case in large texts, extracting the key points requires a great deal of work
on the part of the reader. This paper argues that the development of supple-
mentary graphical notations is useful in expressing the key issues and points
in the plan in a way that is more immediate than paragraphs of text, and in
providing a basis for questioning the assumptions embedded in plans.
The complex relationships which are developed between organisations during
contingency planning suggested to us that techniques previously used for the
analysis of large scale complex socio-technical systems may successfully be
applied to this area. In particular, this paper focuses on analysis of contingency
planning from the perspective of responsibilities. The paper proposes that
responsibility modelling can be effectively employed to model and analyse the
responsibilities that may need to be discharged during a response to a civil
emergency.
The notion of ‘responsibility’ is one that is widely used in everyday discourse
but it is surprisingly difficult to establish a precise definition of the term.
Martin contributed a survey of the philosophy of responsibility to a collection
linking responsibility and the dependability of socio-technical systems [19].
Martin notes the diversity of conceptions of responsibility:
(1) Responsibilities as duties, obligations, jobs and tasks (a secretary is re-
sponsible for recording minutes).
(2) Being responsible for someone or something (a parent is responsible for
their child, an administrator is responsible for a collection of servers).
(3) Being responsible for some event (often adverse) which has occurred (A
government minister, in the UK, is responsible for actions of the civil
servants in her department).
(4) Behaving responsibly. This relates to other conceptions of responsibility,
in that the manner in which goals associated with a responsibility are
achieved are of concern when deciding whether a responsibility has been
appropriately discharged.
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For the purposes of the work described here, we have established the following
definition, which encompasses aspects of the different conceptions described
above:
A duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some given state,
subject to conformance with organisational, social and cultural norms.
The term ‘duty’ refers to more than simply a statement that a given task
should be completed, it also encompasses aspects of accountability. It is im-
portant to note that failure to fulfill a given duty could be due to circumstances
beyond the control of the agent in question. It does not follow automatically
that the agent should be blamed for a given failure.
The terms organisational, social and cultural norms refer to the complex set
of constraints and expectations associated with how the goals associated with
a responsibility are to be discharged. Responsibilities are rarely broken down
to individual instructions (for anything but the most trivial of system this
would extremely difficult), instead they represent higher level constructs en-
compassing a remit for initiative. Initiative is bounded by professional con-
duct, from an organisational perspective as well as wider social and cultural
constraints. For example, doctors discharge responsibilities subject to ethical
constraints and companies operate subject to the financial regulations of their
host country. The notion of a responsibility permits a useful abstraction over
this complexity.
A responsibility model is a way of representing the responsibilities of the agents
and agencies involved in some socio-technical system, the resources required
to discharge these responsibilities and some of the relationships that exist
between responsibilities, agents and resources. Responsibility models can be
used for several different purposes [13]:
(1) As a means of conceptual system modelling [31]. Responsibility modelling
provides a useful abstraction when attempting to explain a complex socio-
technical system to a group of stake holders.
(2) As a means of facilitating discussion about systems that cross organi-
sational boundaries. Responsibility misunderstandings in such situations
are common and by making responsibilities explicit there is the potential
to expose such misunderstandings [20].
(3) As a means of identifying vulnerabilities in a system expressed in terms of
the potential for responsibility failure. Responsibility failure occurs when
an agent does not discharge a responsibility as expected by other agents
in the system. This may occur, for example, due to a misunderstanding
when an agent does not know it is expected by other agents to discharge
a responsibility [31].
(4) As a means of helping to identify information requirements and vulnera-
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bilities. The discharge of a responsibility often requires information to be
available to the agent assigned that responsibility. Responsibility models
can help identify what information is required, where it comes from and
what problems occur if it is unavailable, incomplete or incorrect.
Different types of agent (both technical and human) generally contribute to
the dependability of systems in different ways. For example, technical compo-
nents can perform repetitive tasks without error. Human operators, with their
greater flexibility can often cope with unplanned situations before failures be-
come observable to those interacting with a given system. Given that both
types of system entity are responsible for contributing to the overall depend-
ability of a system, this paper will argue that an analysis of how responsibility
for dependability is distributed throughout a system provides an insight into
potential vulnerabilities of the system. A vulnerability is a latent flaw or fault
in a socio-technical system which could eventually be exposed (commonly in
combination with other vulnerabilities) as a system failure [1,2,27]. For exam-
ple, analysis of a given responsibility model may show how the allocation of
a responsibility to only one agent could create a central point of failure in a
responsibility structure; or identify where a responsibility has been inappro-
priately delegated to an unqualified agent.
Contingency plans cannot provide a detailed explanation of the process by
which an emergency will be managed, given the complexity and unpredictabil-
ity of such events. Responsibility modelling can instead be used as a mecha-
nism to abstract over details that cannot or do not need to be specified in an
overall plan. In addition, the evolving nature of contingency planning can be
supported by the analysis of plan documents from the perspectives of respon-
sibilities to identify potential vulnerabilities that may compromise the success
of the emergency response.
This paper sets out our approach to responsibility modelling and illustrates, by
example, how responsibility models can be useful in planning for civil contin-
gencies. Section 2 presents an outline of the process of contingency planning.
Section 3 examines related work on the use of responsibility modelling for
the analysis of socio-technical systems. Section 4 presents the conceptual ba-
sis for the responsibility models used in this paper whilst Section 5, the case
study, presents a selection of examples of responsibility models constructed
from a real world contingency plan. Finally, Section 6 summarises the work
and considers areas of future research.
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2 Contingency Planning
The term “crisis management” has developed from a number of academic
fields, since at least the 1980s [28], describing the collection of activities which
occur in response to unexpected and adverse events. Perrow has famously
argued (in terms of accidents) that crises are inevitable in complex, interactive
and tightly coupled organisations, a fitting description for modern societies
dependent on a range of inter-related critical infrastructures [24].
Civil emergencies are crises of sufficient scale to require a response from civil
authorities. There are a number of definitions of civil emergencies in the liter-
ature. The UK Civil Contingencies act describes a civil emergency to be “An
event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place
in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which
threatens serious damage to the security of the UK” [7,16]. The corresponding
guidance to the act notes that for the purposes of identifying an emergency
(and thus invoking the relevant aspects of the act) the definition is concerned
with the consequences of an event, rather than the causes [16].
Civil emergencies are typically viewed in three phases: preparation, response
and recovery. During the preparation phase, risk assessments, contingency
planning and emergency exercises are undertaken by responder agencies. The
response to a civil emergency, attention is focused on activities by ‘respon-
ders’ to prevent (further) loss of life, damage to property and resume some
levels of interrupted services. Finally, the recovery phase is a period of time
(possibly years) in which damaged property is restored and interrupted ser-
vices are resumed. During the recovery period it is also normal for responder
organisations, governments and others to review performance during the re-
sponse phase in order to adjust behaviour in the event of a future similar
crisis. Pearson has noted that few responses to crises can be judged against a
success/failure dichotomy [23], given that in most situations, mistakes, even
if not severe in that instance, will be made. Thus even ostensibly successful
responses may provide useful guidance for changes of behaviour in future civil
emergencies.
The process of preparing and planning for a civil emergency in the UK is
illustrated in Figure 2, extracted from the UK government’s guidance on the
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 [7,16]. Contingency planning is a cyclic activity,
divided into two major processes.
For the consultation phase the emergency scenarios that are of interest have to
be identified. Emergency scenario selection is informed by the risk assessment
process, which identifies vulnerabilities in civil infrastructure. However, the
criteria for selecting scenarios, the next stage of planning, are not necessarily
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Fig. 2. The emergency planning cycle, extracted from [16]. The cycle consists of two
major processes; consultation and implementation.
based on the severity or expected frequency of an incident, but may also
be politically motivated. For example, planning for the provision of fallout
shelters during the Cold War was motivated largely by political considerations,
as the probability of use was relatively low, the envisaged costs considerable,
and the end benefits difficult to quantify [36].
To establish plans for a specific emergency scenario, the organisations involved
in the response to an incident must to consulted. In the United Kingdom,
response organisations are coordinated by Civil Resilience Forums, which pro-
vide an administrative basis for contingency planning across organisations.
The outcome of the consultation process is a set of responsibilities assigned to
different agencies in the event of an incident. Contingency planning brings
together organisations with potentially conflicting objectives, so providing
greater clarity in the process helps prevent misunderstandings during an emer-
gency response.
During the Embedding phase the outline plan is disseminated to relevant or-
ganisations for information and to assess the appropriateness of the plan for
each organisational domain. Appropriate training can then be planned and
undertaken. The robustness of an emergency plan and the training provided
to personnel is normally evaluated using emergency exercises. Such exercises
may be “table top”, i.e. largely simulated, or larger scale live exercises with
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appropriate deployment of resources to test the speed of response, reliabil-
ity of communications infrastructure and so on. The use of exercises of this
type is widespread, with UK government policy stating that exercises should
take place for each scenario emergency plan on a regular basis. Exercises are
designed to test the resilience of a given emergency plan and often lead to
substantive changes. This is not necessarily recognition of flaws in the original
plans, rather that the assumptions on which the original plan were written
are no longer completely valid.
3 Background
Responsibility modelling has been proposed by several authors [4,15,33] as
a useful construct for analysing the dependability of socio-technical systems.
The work partly originates from the perceived failure of purely technical so-
lutions. A key preliminary to the development of responsibility analysis is the
identification of a system as consisting of both technical and social/ organi-
sational entities; both of which contribute to the achievement of the overall
goals or objectives that are the systems purpose. The term socio-technical
system, originating in the field of organisational design, has been adopted by
the computer science community, in reference to the interactions that occur
between human and organisational agents and software systems [22]. In addi-
tion to achieving system goals, both social and technical entities contribute to
the broader dependability of a system. The notion that human agents in a sys-
tem, if employed appropriately, can contribute positively to the dependability
of a technical system is one that is often missed in discussions of software
dependability [3].
Graphical models of responsibility were first proposed by Blyth et al in the OR-
DIT methodology [4], a notation for describing the responsibilities that agents
hold with respect to one another. Strens, Dobson and Sommerville have ar-
gued for the importance of analysing responsibility and the need to view roles
with respect to the responsibility relationships they hold [14,15,33]. Dewsbury
and Dobson have edited a collection of papers [13] that describe much of the
research undertaken on responsibility as part of the DIRC project, presenting
analyses of inappropriate responsibility allocation in socio-technical systems.
In particular, the work includes an analysis of the Ladbroke Grove rail accident
inquiry from a perspective of responsibilities [20]. The work also includes a
graphical notation for responsibility by Sommerville. The purpose of the nota-
tion is primarily to support the discussion of responsibility allocations during
a system development process [31], and like the Soft Systems Methodology
[8], its aim is to improve the stakeholders understanding of the siutation.
Goal based modelling approaches, such as i* and KAOS are intended to expose
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high level dependencies between objectives in a given system [11,37]. Sub-
goals may be derived from higher level objectives and assigned to agents for
completion. Goals are achieved through the fulfillment of some or all sub-
goals. Relationships between sub-goals (and, or etc) express the possible ways
in which the super-goal may be achieved. Analysis of such models can examine,
for example, whether a super-goal may fail due to the failure of a single sub-
goal (brittleness), or whether a particular agent has been overloaded with too
many goals to achieve.
Despite some similarities, responsibility modelling differs from goal based tech-
niques. Whilst the notion of responsibility modelling may be viewed as incor-
porating the specification of objectives to be achieved, there is also an ac-
knowledgment that in complex socio-technical systems, the achievement of an
objective (i.e. the discharge of responsibility) is subject to a range of con-
straints and that even with the best efforts of an agent, a goal may not be
achieved. These constraints are difficult to explore and model using a goal-
based approach which focuses principally on what has to be achieved. In con-
trast to goal based systems, there are circumstances in which an authority
may judge that a responsibility has been been appropriately discharged, de-
spite the fact that a goal has not been achieved. Woods has noted (in the
context of accountability and learning in health care organisations) how actors
are required to cooperate with regard to individual responsibilities in order
for broader organisational responsibilities to be discharged [35]. The notion of
responsibility embodies an assumption that it is how an agent acts and not
just what is achieved that is important. In the example given above, a doctor
who has carried out the correct procedures may have successfully discharged
their responsibility for patient care, even though a patient dies.
4 Responsibility Models
A responsibility model is a succinct denotation of the responsibilities involved
in handling some civil emergency, the agents or agencies that have been as-
signed specific responsibilities and the relations between agencies, responsibil-
ities and resources. Construction of responsibility models of contingency plans
clarifies the analysis of modelled relationships for their appropriateness - for
example, whether an agent has been assigned a reasonable responsibility to
discharge.
We have revised the graphical notation proposed by Sommerville as a suite
of related graphical viewpoints with a corresponding formal semantics of the
model. The views simplify the process of diagram (and hence model) construc-
tion by permitting users to concentrate on particular aspects of a responsibility
model at a time. In addition, tool support for the notation guides a user be-
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Fig. 3. Example responsibility assignment. The police are responsible for maintain-
ing law and order. The government is the authority for the responsibility.
tween different viewpoints, providing a sense of inter-connection between the
different views of responsibility.
This section provides an informal explanation of the underlying model of re-
sponsibility adopted for use in the graphical views employed here, for more
detail see [32]. The notation described here is a subset of the entities and
relationships developed for use in a broader collection of case studies of re-
sponsibility modelling.
The model of responsibility presented in this paper is as follows. An agent (de-
noted by a name in angle brackets) may become the holder of a responsibility,
through an act of assignment by another agent or through organisational cus-
tom and practice. Agents may be organisations (denoted by an ‘O’ over the
entity), for example the Fire Service, or individuals (denoted by an ‘H’ over
the entity) for example, Jane Smith. The term assignment here incorporates
responsibility transfer (an agent assigns a responsibility to another) and as-
sumption (an agent assigns a responsibility to itself). The representation of
an agent assigned a responsibility is illustrated in Figure 3. The figure de-
notes the assignment of the responsibility “Maintain the peace” to the agent
“Police”. The Police are the holder of the responsibility (denoted by a line
terminated by a square), whilst the Government is the authority (denoted by
a line, crossed at termination). The authority for a responsibility is responsible
for deciding whether a responsibility has been appropriately discharged.
Figure 4 illustrates the use of organisational entities as a means of constructing
complex agent structures. Contingency plans often refer to a group of agents
as collectively the holders of some responsibility. In the example shown in
Figure 4(a), a single organisation, the ‘Silver Command’ is denoted as being
responsible for coordination of tasks (allocated to one or more operational
‘Bronze’ commands). This reflects the terminology used in the UK to refer to
the coordination structures for dealing with civil emergencies.
In this example, the notion of a ‘Silver Command’ organisation is an abstrac-
tion; in fact the responsibilities are discharged by liason between four ‘actual’
agencies, the Police, Ambulance Service, Fire & Rescue Service and Local
10
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. ‘Silver Command’ responsibilities and organisational membership. Figure
4(a) illustrates the responsibilities of the ‘Silver Command’ organisation, an organ-
isation which is established to provide a tactical coordinating response to emergen-
cies. Figure 4(b) illustrates the typical membership of a Silver Command.
Authority who are all members of Silver Command. Membership of the ‘Sil-
ver Command’ organisation is denoted by a line terminated by a diamond in
Figure 4(b). Other agencies using the contingency plan do not need to con-
cern themselves with how these agencies will discharge their responsibilities.
Rather, other agencies may use the model to develop more detailed plans of
the discharge of their own responsibilities, without concern for the detailed
planning by the ‘Silver Command’ organisations.
Thus far, the discussion of the responsibility model has referred to two basic
types, responsibilities and agents. However, to provide more detail for respon-
sibility scenarios, we need to introduce the notion of a resource. Resources are
artifacts in a responsibility model that are used by agents in the discharge
of responsibilities. They are categorised as information resources and physical
resources. Information resources are used to model the information require-
ments needed to discharge a responsibility, such as an evacuation priority list.
Physical resources refer to artifacts employed by an agent in order to discharge
their responsibility, portable flood barriers, for example.
A recurring theme identified in debrief reports of emergency response exercises
are failures related to communication arrangements. Such reports describe how
participants did not receive necessary information in order to discharge their
responsibilities in a timely fashion, or similarly did not distribute information
to others appropriately. Johnson describes how a bomb threat to the Atlanta
Olympics was delayed in reaching the relevant police officers, even though the
threat had included a specific location [17]. The information was delayed be-
cause the communications infrastructure did not include descriptions of the
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temporary Olympic sites. Additionally, Smith has noted that seemingly real-
istic emergency scenarios are often dismissed by organisational management
because they are perceived as being either of low probability or prevented from
occurring by existing controls [29].
We have therefore designed our modelling notation so that HAZOPS-style
“what if” risk analysis can also be applied to information resources to present
an analysis of a plan’s robustness in the event of failure of these resources.
HAZOPS methodologies were designed to analyse industrial processes, pre-
dominantly in the chemical industry; however they have also been employed
for the analysis of information systems for example [6,21], in order to estab-
lish the consequences of failure of particular information flows. An advantage
of this systematic approach to scenarios is that stakeholders are encouraged
to consider the consequences of particular events occurring, even if they are
judged to be of low probability. HAZOPS-style analysis is provided as part of
the case study examples within this paper, to illustrate the application of this
approach.
5 Case Study
To illustrate our approach, this section presents a case study which illustrates
the use of responsibility modelling as a tool for the reliability analysis of a con-
tingency plan. The work presented in this case study is an illustrative analysis
constructed on the basis of written documents. It highlights the benefits of
our approach and could act as the basis for stimulating discussions about
the information and assumptions in the plan. We do not claim that the case
study demonstrates vulnerabilities that still exist within a prepared response
to flooding.
The responsibility modelling notation is used to document examples of respon-
sibility assignment from the contingency plan. The purpose of the modelling
is to represent the salient parts of contingency plans in an easily readable
format, and to provide a framework for questioning these plans to identify
possible errors and omissions. Thus, we believe, we can avoid system prob-
lems and failures when an emergency occurs which affect the dependability of
the overall socio-technical system.
The responsibility models are derived from a collection of documents related to
the storms and associated flooding in January 2005 which occurred in Carlisle,
a city in the north of England. We have used several documents including: the
Cumbria County Council General Emergency Plan [9], which was the initial
contingency plan upon which the emergency response to the floods was based;
the debriefing report for the storms, which reviewed the performance of the
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Fig. 5. Extent of floods around Carlisle, Cumbria January 2005. Source: [12].
plan in retrospect of the emergency [12]; and the Cumbria County Council
flood plan, which was developed following the floods of 2005 [10].
The models presented illustrate particular examples from the debrief report
where the mis-understanding or mis-assignment of responsibilities in the plan
caused difficulties during the response. The models are also used as a basis
for conducting a HAZOPS-style analysis of information resources which are
likely to be needed to discharge a responsibility, and assesses the likelihood
and consequences of the information’s unavailability.
5.1 Background
Between 7th and 8th of January 2005, the north west of England and, in
particular, the city of Carlisle suffered substantial flooding due to heavy rain-
fall. The flooding was a combination of the heavy rainfall and the blocking of
drainage channels by debris caused by the storms. In addition to the flood-
ing, the severe storms caused structural damage to buildings, and caused 24
large vehicles to be blown over, blocking major access roads. The flood was
worsened by the increased flow of water down the local river (the Eden) from
further up-stream, causing the river to burst its banks (Figure 5 illustrates
the extent of the floods, showing that nearly 40
An early consequence of the flooding was the loss of several premises signif-
icant to the emergency response, including the police headquarters, the fire
service headquarters in Carlisle and the city’s Civic Centre, which would oth-
erwise have been used as a reception centre for evacuees. The loss of the police
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HQ meant the loss of a number of IT systems that would otherwise have been
employed in the command and control of the response. In addition, by the
morning of the 8th January, electrical power throughout Carlisle had been
lost due to the flooding of a critical substation. Mobile cell phone communi-
cations were also affected. By late afternoon on the same day, the UHF radio
transmitter on the civic centre began to fail as its batteries exhausted.
As a consequence, the Cumbria General Emergency plan was invoked (there
was no specific flood plan) and a major incident was declared. Strategic (Gold)
and tactical (Silver) commands were established at Penrith police station,
and at Carlisle Castle respectively. These locations are approx 30km from
each other. The transfer of command and control functions to these alternate
premises caused immediate difficulties, since the new IT suite at Penrith had
not yet been completed, and Gold command did not have access to relevant
local information (maps of Carlisle etc) at their new location.
To respond to the emergency, the police established a mobile police station in
the city centre and initiated a search and rescue operation in conjunction with
the Fire Service in the areas affected by flooding. This included the establish-
ment of rendezvous locations near to the flooded areas. The local Ambulance
Service Trust was responsible for transportation of evacuated residents from
rendezvous locations to reception centres, as well as supporting medical care in
the centres. Boats and RAF helicopters were used to assist in the evacuations.
Three reception centres were established for evacuees and provisioned with
essentials, including food and emergency generators. In addition to the im-
mediate response, Gold command also coordinated communications with the
media in order to distribute information, including advice to evacuate areas
of Carlisle where possible.
Following the flooding, the Cumbria County Emergency Planning office revised
their preparations and prepared a new plan specifically to respond to flood
events [10]. This was a significant amendment of the previous plan which
incorporated their experiences of dealing with the flooding emergency.
The rest of this section presents a selection of responsibility models with par-
ticular reference to the discharge of responsibilities associated with evacuation.
The models progress from describing problems which arose during evacuation
of residents during the 2005 floods described above, to analysing the specific
flood response plans prepared following the evaluation of the response under-
taken.
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(a) Planned Responsibilities.
(b) Responsibilities assigned during the response.
Fig. 6. Responsibilities and resources associated with evacuation of flooded areas.
5.2 Evacuation in 2005
As part of the response to the flooding in 2005 described above, the Police
Force were responsible to Silver Command for evacuation of residents from ar-
eas threatened by flooding, whilst the Fire Service were responsible for search
and rescue operations in flooded areas. These two responsibilities are distinct,
since evacuation involves moving people who are not in imminent danger to
known rendezvous locations and then transporting them from these locations
to reception centres; search and rescue involves recovering people who are im-
mediately threatened (residents of areas already flooded, for example), from
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their homes to these known locations.
Responsibility models can be used as the basis of a discussion of the responsi-
bility structures documented in the contingency plan and the manner in which
responsibilities were discharged during the floods in January of 2005. The as-
signment of responsibilities for evacuation anticipated in the Emergency Plan
is illustrated in Figure 6(a). In addition, the figure illustrates the informa-
tion resources (denoted by text between vertical lines and annotated with ‘I’),
required by the Police Force in order to discharge their responsibility:
Priority List The list of residences that should be evacuated as a priority.
These include, for example, nursing homes and residential care homes.
Evacuated List A list of residences that have already been evacuated, either
by the police, or by the residents themselves. This list allows the police to
avoid visiting every residence and concentrate resources on priorities.
Rendezvous Locations A list of locations where the Fire Service are able
to leave rescued residents so that they can be evacuated to reception centres
by the police.
We see from Figure 5 (a) that both evacuation and search and rescue require
a shared information resource, namely, the list of rendezvous locations. These
are the places where people gather to be transported to the reception centres.
One of the benefits of a model is that it allows us to pose general questions
which may reveal vulnerabilities. So, when a model reveals that different re-
sponsibilities share information, we can ask the following questions:
What mechanisms exist to ensure that all agents involved have access to
the shared information?
How are changes to the shared information propagated to all responsi-
bilities?
During the response to the flooding, it became apparent that the Police Force
required assistance in evacuating residents from rendezvous locations to re-
ception centres. To provide the extra capacity, the Police Force delegated re-
sponsibility for assisting in evacuation to the Ambulance Service Trust. Figure
6(b) illustrates the responsibilities regarding evacuation after the delegation.
“The Trust was requested to supply vehicles to assist in the movement
of people from the affected areas although there was confusion regarding
a rendezvous point (RVP). Fire and Police requests for vehicles to assist
with the evacuation were to addresses that were inaccessible and not to a
predetermined RVP.” [12, pp68]
The Trust’s debrief report suggests that rendezvous locations agreed prior to
the flooding were changed, and that alternative locations also became un-
available during the course of the flooding. The report is of interest, since it
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Fig. 7. HAZOPS analysis of the evacuation list resource.
describes how an agent was assigned a responsibility, but lacked the associated
information resources in order to effectively discharge that responsibility. Ask-
ing the above questions when responsibilities changed may have highlighted
this problem.
Figure 6(b) illustrates the information required by the Trust to discharge its
responsibility, but does not provide an analysis of the consequences if that
information is unavailable or inaccurate. For this purpose, a HAZOPS-style
analysis of information resources can be employed [6,21]. For the analysis, risks
associated with information resources are identified using context relevant
guide words:
Never A responsibility must be discharged by an agent without relevant in-
formation.
Late Information is delayed in reaching an agent. This may mean that the
agent must begin to discharge a responsibility without all required informa-
tion.
Early Information reaches an agent before required. This may be problem-
atic, for example, in circumstances where the information is sensitive, e.g.
names of casualties resulting from an accident being released to media or-
ganisations before families are contacted.
Inaccurate Information which reaches an agent contains errors.
The risks are then assessed for consequences for the system should they oc-
cur. Applying HAZOPS-style analysis to models of responsibility provides a
means of analysing the information requirements associated with the effec-
tive discharge of a responsibility; that is, what does an agent need to know
in order to discharge their assigned responsibility? For contingency planning,
the analysis provides a means of assessing potential vulnerabilities in planning
documents, if for example, an agent has been assigned a responsibility without
access to the relevant information. The methodology is used to investigate the
consequences of particular aspects of the plan failing, and thus the robustness
of the plan as information resources become unreliable.
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Fig. 8. Responsibilites and associated information resources for flood warning.
Figure 7 shows a HAZOPS-style description of the risks associated with the
Rendezvous Locations information resource. In each case, the probability and
consequences of the risk occurring are stated. For example, the risk that the
Trust receives inaccurate information results in ambulances being sent to the
wrong locations, wasting resources that could be deployed elsewhere. This
reflects the situation in which the Trust is not updated on new locations
being used by other agents.
5.3 Analysis of Revised Plan
Following the floods in January 2005, a revised flood plan was constructed.
Figure 8 illustrates the responsibilities associated with the issue of a flood
warning by the Environment Agency in the revised plan. The figure illustrates
the responsibility of the agency for maintaining a flood watch, with three re-
lated information resources (river levels, catchment area status and rainfall).
In addition, the agency is responsible for issuing a flood warning when neces-
sary, which has an associated information resource – the flood warning itself,
which describes the areas that may be affected by a flood.
The responsibility model here shows that issuing a flood warning involves
collecting data for flood forecasting then, when appropriate, issuing a flood
warning. In this case, we have an example of a situation where the same or-
ganisational agent has multiple responsibilities. In such situations, the generic
question that we should ask is:
When an agent holds multiple responsibilities, how are these coordinated
and what information must be exchanged?
Figure 9 illustrates the responsibilities of different agencies for evacuation
once a flood warning has been issued, and Figure 10 illustrates the same re-
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Fig. 9. Evacuation responsibilities
sponsibilities with associated information resources. In the plan, responsibility
for evacuation and required resources are discussed explicitly. The figure illus-
trates that in the revised plan Silver command are responsible for the initiation
of evacuation, based on the advice provided by the Environment Agency of
flood warnings and associated risks. Once a decision has been made to evac-
uate, several agencies are required to coordinate their activities in order to
execute an evacuation:
• The police are responsible for the overall coordination of an evacuation and
the security of evacuated residences
• The Fire Brigade are responsible for the conduct of search and rescue op-
erations
• The County Council is responsible for establishing reception centres during
an emergency response
• The District Council are responsible for arranging transport between as-
sembly points and reception centres for evacuees
In addition, a number of information resources are identified explicitly in the
plan:
• The list of evacuated residents, collated at reception centres
• The location of assembly points as rendezvous locations between search and
rescue operations and transportation to the reception centres
Figure 9 summarises the responsibilities for evacuation as documented in the
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Fig. 10. Evacuation information resources
revised plan. Comparison with the previous arrangement of the responsibili-
ties (Figures 6) illustrates how responsibilities and assignments have changed.
In contrast to the approach documented in the debrief report, partially illus-
trated in Figure 6, a clearer distinction is made between the responsibilities
of the police (coordination) and other agencies. In addition, responsibility for
transporting evacuees from assembly points is now placed with the District
Council, rather than (as in 2005) the Ambulance Service Trust. Responsibility
for establishing reception centres has also been modified; in the revised plan,
the responsibility is assigned explicitly to the County Council. In addition,
the description of the responsibility illustrates that the council are responsi-
ble for establishing centres during the response, in reference to the loss of the
anticipated reception centre, the Civic Centre, in the 2005 floods.
Whilst the revised plan documents some of the information resources that will
be required during the emergency response, omissions were noted, which could
result in vulnerabilities during a flooding response. What we immediately see
from Figure 9, is that there is no agent associated with the responsibility
‘Collect Evacuee Information’. This is a classic responsibility vulnerability
as described by Sommerville [31] - an unassigned responsibility. Unassigned
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Fig. 11. Coastguard responsibility for inland evacuation (in assistance to the Fire
Brigade).
responsibilities can lead to failure or delay because the other agents in the
system must negotiate to decide who will take over this responsibility and
ensure that this knowledge is communicated to those who need to kmnow.
Figure 10 extends Figure 9 to show the information resources required to dis-
charge the responsibility. It reveals that the collection of evacuee information
requires a resource which is an evacuee list. Failure to assign a responsibility
means that it is unclear who is responsible for compiling this list.
5.4 Coastguard Assistance
During the evacuation caused by floods in 2005, the resources of the Coast-
guard, normally deployed for coastal or maritime search and rescue operations,
were used inland to assist the Fire Brigade with evacuation of flooded areas.
This (then ad-hoc) arrangement, is reflected explicitly in the revised plan,
and illustrated as a responsibility structure in Figure 11, which illustrates the
consequences of constraints for discharge of responsibilities.
Constraints refer to the manner in which a responsibility will normally be
discharged by an agency. In addition, the example illustrates how further ad-
ditional responsibilities may be assigned as a result of an initial responsibility
delegation. The example refers to the listing of Coastguard responsibilities in
the revised flooding plan and the similar description of responsibilities for the
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Royal National Lifeboat Institution, a largely voluntary organisation [10, §3
pp3-5].
The figure illustrates that the Fire Brigade are responsible for Inland Search
and Rescue, as (for consistency) is stated in Figure 9. The Coastguard and
RNLI are both responsible for maritime and coastal search and rescue oper-
ations. In addition, the Coastguard and the RNLI may also be responsible
for inland search and rescue, but these are subject to constraints. The figure
denotes that the Coastguard and RNLI uses their available physical resources
(resources annotated by an ‘A’) to assist in Inland search and rescue. For the
Coastguard, the constraint applies to the sharing of suitable boats and crews
between the tasks of maritime and inland search and rescue, with maritime
search and rescue considered an organisational priority. Thus, the agency may
not be able to assist in search and rescue operations resulting from inland
flooding when engaged in operations off-shore. Similarly the RNLI may also
assist in the discharge of search and rescue responsibilities, subject to the
availability of boats for inshore use. The revised flood plan also describes how
assistance will only be provided in circumstances where the RNLI organisa-
tion judges there to be an immediate threat to life, and may withdraw those
resources once the threat has subsided.
In addition, the model shows that, as stated in the emergency plan, RNLI con-
siders the Fire Brigade responsible for provision of refreshments to the RNLI
team whilst that organisation assists in search and rescue operations. This il-
lustrates how the assignment of responsibilities to an organisation may result
in the further assignment of responsibilities to third parties in order for the
responsibility to be discharged. This seems to be a low-level detail but it was
quite explicit in the revised flood plan. We suspect there are political reasons
for this. Highlighting it in a responsibility model means that its relevance can
be discussed by the agents involved.
Figure 12 illustrates a HAZOPS-style analysis of some of the information
resources identified in the revised plan with respect to associated responsi-
bilities. The upper form analyses the consequences of failure with respect to
the initiation of an evacuation, identifying the importance of the issue of a
flood warning in order to ensure the timeliness of response by the emergency
services, and the importance of correct information on flooding events in order
to prepare an accurate response.
The lower part of the figure analyses information resources associated with
the coordination of an evacuation (a responsibility assigned to the police).
The importance of accurate information on assembly points has already been
discussed above, although the analysis is extended here to the potential risk of
early distribution of information on assembly points, if this information later
becomes inaccurate.
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Fig. 12. HAZOPS analysis of the revised evacuation plan information resources.
The HAZOPS-style documentation also analyses risks associated with infor-
mation concerning evacuees. In particular, accurate and timely information
is required on the location and numbers of evacuees within areas at risk of
flooding. The revised plan for flooding in Cumbria contains an appendix list-
ing the flood catchment areas and approximate number of residents. However,
the approximation is made on a generic multiplier of the number of residencies
in the area, which may not be appropriate for small geographic divisions in
which large deviations from the mean average may be expected.
5.5 Information Channels
Following the HAZOPS-style analysis of the information resources required
for evacuation, a further responsibility model may be constructed of the com-
munications infrastructure on which information will be communicated. This
is necessary as vulnerabilities are not just due to information issues but may
also arise because of problems in the communication channels used to transmit
and share information.
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Fig. 13. HAZOPS of physical resources.
The use of cellular networks in particular raises a number of issues that need
to be outlined in order to identify possible responsibility vulnerabilities. In
most emergency operations communications play an important role. Personnel
equipped with mobile phones as resources could be affected by constraints
including:
(1) Power, both for individual units and for mast relays
(2) Availability of specially equipped handsets in the event of the activation
of the “Access Overload Control System” which can, in emergencies filter
traffic to allow communication only by enabled handsets
(3) Operation of the existing fixed line system. Subject to power, the mobile
network often operates beyond that of the fixed exchanges in flooding
situations; however communication with fixed lines would still only be
possible if the fixed exchanges were still in service.
(4) Cost implications. Although in actual emergencies these constraints are
often relaxed, contingency planning is designed to consider the provision-
ing of such resources in the long term. This constraint could, for example
affect the number of handsets in circulation for emergencies.
We are now working on developing a HAZOPS-style analysis for communica-
tion channels in emergency planning. Such an analysis of the communications
resources can aid the user in the identification of risks associated with a given
resource’s state. This is illustrated in Figure 13. We must emphasise here
that this represents an early stage for this type of analysis and that we have
identified further development of resource hazard analysis as a future area of
research.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has described the potential for applying the notion of modelling
responsibility to the task of contingency planning for civil emergencies. The
preceding sections have presented three example views of a model of responsi-
bility based on a general contingency plan, flooding incident debrief report and
a subsequent revised plan. The different views have presented several benefits
of using responsibility modelling in the domain of civil emergencies:
• A convenient summary of the contents of contingency plans. As we have
discussed above, the contingency plans we have examined are large, verbose
documents that are rarely used actively. Graphical responsibility models
summarise large tracts of information (which are often structured in terms of
responsibilities) for quick reference, either during dissemination and training
or during an actual emergency.
• A basis for identification of vulnerabilities in contingency plans. Vulnera-
bilities are latent flaws in systems which may combine and result in failure.
Graphical models of responsibility can be used to identify and make ex-
plicit vulnerabilities in a contingency plan as a basis for further discussion
between stakeholders.
• A starting point for identifying requirements for supporting information
systems. Responsibility models include the associated resources (including
information resources) required by agents assigned particular responsibil-
ities to discharge. Such information requirements can be analysed via a
HAZOPS-style methodology to test contingency plan robustness. The in-
formation requirements and analysis results can then be used as the basis
for deriving requirements for information systems designed to support com-
munication during an emergency response.
Our work so far suggests that we can obtain new insights into contingency
plans by representing these using responsibility models, and that responsibil-
ity and information vulnerabilities can be identified from these models. Our
intention is that continuing collaboration with organisations involved in civil
contingency planning will develop the work further. In particular, observa-
tions of emergency exercises will provide an opportunity to understand the
manner in which contingency plans are executed in response to an incident
(this does not necessarily refer to a plan document). In order to facilitate our
interactions with collaborating organisations, and to advance and evaluate
the research completed so far a software tool has been developed to support
the construction and analysis of responsibility modelling diagrams. Specific
avenues of future research are discussed below:
Analyses of communication channels As discussed, we have started de-
veloping an approach to analysing vulnerabilities in communication chan-
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nels. This is a complex problem as these resources are not simple entities
where single guide words can prompt a complete analysis. In our research,
we plan to explore how to extend HAZOPS-style analyses for such channels.
Operational responsibility modelling Our current approach to responsi-
bility modelling is based on a static structure of responsibility as expressed
in plans. During the operation of complex systems (an actual emergency
response for example), responsibilities are dynamic and contingent on local
circumstances where an emergency arises. With this approach, resources
are analysed as the requirements associated with the discharge of respon-
sibility. An avenue of research we wish to pursue is to examine how re-
sponsibility models can be used operationally to support decision making
by emergency managers. This will require us to represent the actual rather
than the planned allocation of responsibilities and the use of resources as
responsibilities are discharged.
Operational responsibility tool support Our existing methodology and
tooling is suitable for responsibility planning, but not operation. In order
to support access and modification of responsibility models by multiple
personnel at different locations, we are developing a mobile responsibility
modelling platform, which we plan to evaluate through collaboration with
appropriate organisations.
Timeliness One significant omission from the model of responsibility assign-
ment used within these examples is the notion of timely discharge of an
agent’s responsibility. A desirable extension to the model would be to de-
scribe not only the dependencies of an agent, but the time constraints of
those dependencies. One potential approach would be the integration of the
model of timeliness proposed by Burns et al [5] into the semantics of re-
sponsibility assignment described above. Other possible approaches to this
area can be seen in the literature for KAOS [11] and i* [37].
Deontic Logic The similarity between our work on responsibility modelling
and the use of deontic logics (logics of norms, obligations and permissions)
for system specification by various authors (e.g. [18,34]) was noted in a re-
view of this paper. The methodology described in this paper is intended
as a basis for supporting the discussion of responsibilities between relevant
stakeholders in a scenario. We are currently investigating the potential ben-
efits of formalising some aspects of the responsibility models constructed in
terms of deontic logic, e.g. in providing tool support for identifying more
complex responsibility vulnerabilities.
In this paper we advocate that the overall dependability of complex systems
that cross organisational boundaries requires us to take a holistic approach
to systems engineering. It is not enough to focus on simply improving the
dependability of the technical components of the system (hardware and soft-
ware); it is not even sufficient to extend this with an analysis of individual
human factors. Rather, we must also investigate how social and organisational
factors influence system dependability and provide some means for systems
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designers to to analyse and understand these issues. We see our work on re-
sponsibility modelling as an attempt to provide engineers with a means of
analysing and understanding some of the organisational issues that affect sys-
tem dependability.
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